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Introduction
Access to the internet is increasingly recognised as being “as indispensable as
electricity, gas or water”.1 As we have become dependent on the internet for our
work, rest and play, constraints placed over our access to and use of this resource
have become politically charged. The Digital Economy Act 2010 continues to be
the subject of much heated debate over provisions that could allow the suspension
of a subscriber’s internet access service for reasons of copyright infringement2;
while, conversely, the Coalition Government has recently announced its intention
to drop internet bans in “control orders” in favour of more limited communication
restrictions under the new regime.3This article considers this general issue, focusing
upon the use of sexual offences prevention orders which frequently contain
provisions prohibiting or restricting access to the internet.
Obviously, where a person has used the internet to commit a criminal offence,
the courts may impose a sentence to punish and deter the individual from continuing
to commit such conduct. However, as a supplement to the sentence, the court may
issue a preventive order imposing one or more controls on the future conduct of
the defendant.4 Controls may be placed on the activities he engages in, the places
he goes to, or the things he has. In a traditional environment such an order may,
for example, prohibit the perpetrator from leaving or entering a designated
geographical area, restrict his movements, or prevent him from holding a particular
job or from working in a particular environment. In a cybercrime context, an
1 “Super-fast broadband for the whole country is vital to future prosperity”, former PrimeMinister Gordon Brown,
Daily Telegraph, January 8, 2010.
2Communications Act 2003 s.124G, inserted by the Digital Economy Act 2010 s.9. A failure to comply with a
technical obligation would be subject to enforcement by Ofcom as a contravention of a condition under ss.94–96,
which could result in a maximum fine of £250,000 (s.124L).
3See Home Office, Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers — Review Findings and Recommendations,
Cm.8004, January 2011, at p.42, para.26, vii.
4 Such conditions may also form part of a conditional bail, where there are specific concerns that a suspect may
engage in inappropriate behaviour. For example, Gary McKinnon, the alleged hacker contesting extradition to the
United States, reportedly had bail conditions which ban him from using “any computer connected to the internet”.
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obvious subject for control is the person’s use of the technologies employed in the
course of his criminal activities. This may involve the confiscation and destruction
of existing IT equipment,5 or prohibitions on future conduct in respect of the use
of certain ICTs.6 In the recent guilty plea by Jon Venables, one of the killers of
James Bulger, to three charges of downloading images and films depicting child
abuse, in addition to the sentence of three years’ imprisonment the judge ordered
forfeiture and destruction of the relevant laptop computer and imposed a five-year
order preventing the defendant from owning or using any computer which did not
have specialist software to block images of child abuse.7
Such IT restrictions have been around since the early days of computer-related
crime.When, in 1989, the US hacker KevinMitnick was convicted, the prosecution
requested that he be prohibited from using or possessing all computers, software
and networking equipment. This was contested by the defence, and the court
eventually imposed a condition permitting him computer access only with the
consent of his probation officer.8 Indeed, during the trial itself, Mitnick was
restricted as to the telephone numbers he could call.9 Similarly, the hacker Kevin
Poulsen was given the following “special conditions” when on probation,
“… you shall not obtain or possess any computer or computer related
equipment or programs without the permission and approval of the probation
officer; and you shall not seek or maintain employment that allows you access
to computer equipment without prior approval of the probation officer.”10
In the United States, certain states, including Nevada, Florida and New Jersey,
have statutory provisions mandating the imposition of internet restrictions on
convicted sex offenders.11 In the United Kingdom, the issue of a prohibition on
accessing the internet has arisen in a number of recent sentencing decisions,
particularly in relations to sexual offences prevention orders (SOPOs), which were
introduced by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 ss.104 to 113, replacing powers under
the Sex Offenders Act 1997 s.5A.
Sexual Offences Prevention Orders
A court may make a SOPO where an offender has been convicted of a sexual
offence listed in Sch.3 to the 2003 Act or a sexual offence listed in Sch.5 where
the content of the offence gives rise to concern over the risk of future sexual
offending.12 A SOPO takes effect either for a fixed period of not less than five
years, as specified in the order, or until further order.13 An order for less than five
5 For examples of courts ordering forfeiture of the defendant’s computer as a form of punishment, see Sheppard
and Whittle [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 455 and Townsend-Johnson [2010] EWCA Crim 1027. The relevant provision
is the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 2000 s.143.
6 e.g. a “prohibited activity” requirement issued as a requirement of a “community sentence”, under the Criminal
Justice Act 2003 s.203.
7 The Times, July 24, 2010.
8 See www.freekevin.com [Accessed September 2006]
9K. Hafner and J. Markoff, Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier (Simon and Schuster:
New York, 1991), p.342; B. BloomBecker, Spectacular Computer Crimes (Dow Jones-Irwin: Illinois, 1990).
10Letter from Marc J. Stein, US Probation Officer to Kevin Poulsen, May 22, 1996, quoted in D. Thomas,
“Criminality on the electronic frontier” in D. Thomas and I. Loader (2000), p.30.
11See generally, E. Brant, “Sentencing ‘cybersex offenders’: Individual offenders require individualised conditions
when courts restrict their computer use and internet access” (2009) 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 779.
12 SOA 2003 s.104(1).
13 SOA 2003 s.107(1).
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years is therefore unlawful. General practice now is to make the length of the
SOPO commensurate with the period of sex offender notification which arises
automatically upon conviction under the 2003 Act.14 A SOPO can only be made
where the court is satisfied that it is “necessary” to make such an order, for the
purpose of “protecting the public or any particular members of the public from
serious sexual harm from the defendant”.15 In turn, “serious sexual harm” means
“serious physical or psychological harm caused by the defendant committing one
or more offences listed”. A SOPO may prohibit the offender from doing anything
described in the order, provided that the restrictions imposed are “necessary” in
the above sense. This means that a SOPO may include little more than might be
set out in standard licence conditions, but in some cases the requirements can be
very restrictive. They may involve engagement with the person’s right to privacy
(art.8) and right to freedom of expression (art.10) under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).16 Breach of a SOPO is a criminal offence, irrespective
of whether the facts disclosed by the breach would constitute a criminal offence
in themselves. If a person, without reasonable excuse, does anything prohibited
by a SOPO, they are liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years.17
In Terrell18 the offender pleaded guilty before the magistrates to making indecent
images of a child, and was committed for sentence. The Court of Appeal quashed
the sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP) imposed by the Crown
Court judge. The Court of Appeal agreed that there was a clear risk that the
defendant would continue to offend in a similar way in future, but found that there
was no evidence that his conduct would escalate to photographing children, or to
abusing them. In the circumstances the defendant was not sufficiently “dangerous”
to qualify for an indeterminate custodial sentence. The Court therefore substituted
a determinate custodial sentence, saying that in cases such as the present it may
be possible to avoid an indeterminate sentence by imposing “apt and effective
restrictions” in a SOPO, such as “use of a computer, internet access [and] possibly
contact with individuals or children” which would address the degree of risk and
the seriousness of harm”.19Terrell has been followed in later sentencing decisions
which show that, for themost part, offenders convicted of downloading and viewing
child pornography are appropriately dealt with in that way.20 The distinction drawn
in Terrell between cases appropriate for IPP and those which can better be dealt
with by a SOPO has, however, given rise to a subsequent conflict in different
divisions of the Court of Appeal in sentencing cases. On one view indeterminate
sentences and SOPOs must be regarded as mutually exclusive.21 On another view
the two orders can, and often should, be imposed together.22
14Hammond [2008] EWCA Crim 1358; Smith [2009] EWCA Crim 1795; Hemsley [2010] EWCA Crim 225.
15 SOA 2003 s.107(2).
16The imposition of pre-trial constraints, such as those imposed on McKinnon (see fn.4), may also engage art.6
“fair trial” issues, such as the requirement of “adequate facilities” to prepare a defence (at 6(3)(b)). However, such
considerations are beyond the scope of this article.
17 SOA 2003 s.113(1) and (2).
18 Terrell [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 49.
19 Terrell [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 49 (p.307).
20Waller [2010] EWCA Crim 728; [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 101; [2010] Crim. L.R. 655.
21Bolton [2010] EWCA Crim 1177; R. v L [2010] EWCA Crim 2046.
22R v N [2010] EWCA Crim 1624 contains a clear statement to that effect.
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SOPOs and the internet
SOPOs regularly include restrictions on the defendant’s future use of a computer
and access to the internet. In many of the earlier cases total bans on owning or
using a computer, or on accessing the internet were imposed. Given, however, that
the only prohibitions which should be included in a SOPO are those which are
“necessary” to achieve the statutory purpose, in later cases the prohibitions have
been more tailored to fit the particular offender, and the particular risk that he
appears to represent. In Smith (Edmund),23 a general ban on the use of a computer
or access to the internet was overturned on the grounds that it was unnecessary
and disproportionate, and in TO24 a complete ban was said to be “draconian”. In
Halloren,25 an order was quashed on the grounds that the sentencing judge had not
adequately considered the statutory criteria or whether the order was strictly
“necessary” to achieve the statutory objectives. InHammond,26 the court amended
a SOPO in terms of its duration and its scope, holding that the general downloading
restriction was too wide, and should be limited to photographs and
pseudo-photographs of persons under the age of 18. Another example is Smith
(Paul)27 where the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of indecent images of
children and received nine months’ imprisonment together with a SOPO. The
Court of Appeal upheld an order which prohibited the defendant from downloading,
saving or viewing any material from the internet save “for purposes of lawful
employment, study, leisure or social interactions with persons over the age of 18”.28
In Spratley29 no objection was taken to a prohibition preventing the defendant
“from accessing, viewing, downloading or saving, images from any child internet
site, accessing any internet-based chat rooms or similar communication group or
network”.30Other authorities suggest that if the offender represents a risk to children
of a particular age, or gender, any preventive order should properly be limited so
as to restrict only his access to children of that group.31
InCollard,32 the defendant was found guilty of offences of making and possessing
indecent images of children. As well as imposing a term of imprisonment, the
court also made a restraining order under the then Sex Offenders Act 1997 s.5A,
the terms of which were,
“… that you be prohibited from owning, using, possessing or having any
access to any personal computer, laptop computer or any other equipment
capable of downloading anymaterial from the Internet. That prohibition does
not apply to any such equipment which you have and use for the purpose of
any lawful employment at and only at a place of such employment.”
23 Smith (Edmund) [2008] EWCA Crim 3083.
24 TO [2010] EWCA Crim 2511.
25Halloren [2004] EWCA Crim 233; [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 57; [2004] Crim. L.R. 392.
26Hammond [2008] EWCA Crim 1358.
27 Smith (Paul) [2009] EWCA Crim 1795.
28 Smith (Paul) [2009] EWCA Crim 1795 at [8].
29 Spratley [2010] EWCA Crim 1411.
30 Spratley [2010] EWCA Crim 1411 at [24]. The order originally referred to “news groups”, but was amended on
appeal to encompass the ejusdem generis.
31R. v C [2008] EWCA Crim 2691; [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 5; [2009] Crim. L.R. 302; Buchanan (Kevin Mark)
[2010] EWCA Crim 1316.
32Collard [2004] EWCA Crim 1664.
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The defendant appealed against the scope of this order. The court allowed the
appeal, noting that such a wide prohibition would also effectively deprive his wife
and children from access to the internet, and therefore amended the order in the
following terms,
“… that you be prohibited from downloading any material from the Internet,
that prohibition not applying to downloading for the purpose of any lawful
employment or lawful study.”
Such considerations, attempting to minimise collateral interference with home life
and the rights of others, should clearly be in the mind of the judge when drafting
the terms of such an order. It has also been held that a restriction on the defendant’s
IT usage that involves or requires the co-operation of a third party, such as the
owner of the device, may well be unacceptable.33 A parallel can be drawn here
with the statutory restrictions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on inserting a curfew
requirement or an electronic monitoring requirement into a community order or
suspended sentence, where such requirement would adversely affect the rights of
third parties, including those living in the same accommodation.34
It would seem obvious from what has been said already that a SOPO should not
be made routinely, as an uncontested “add-on” to the sentence. A batch of recent
Court of Appeal decisions on appeal against sentence, however, show that SOPOs
are sometimes imposed in this way—made “on the hoof”, as Henriques J. expressed
it in R. v R.35 The cases show that a draft order is sometimes produced, and agreed
to, at the sentencing hearing with little or no opportunity given to the defence, or
to the judge, to consider the proposed requirements properly. In a busy court list,
such an order might be made without full attention being given to it. On appeal
against sentence in Buchanan,36 where the draft order had been provided to the
court moments before the sentencing hearing, the Court of Appeal stressed the
importance of proper time and consideration being given to the terms of a SOPO.
The Court suggested that if, by the conclusion of a trial or the opening of a plea
of guilty the judge has formed a provisional view as to the imposition of a SOPO,
when the judge directs the preparation of a pre-sentence report, and a consideration
of the risk of dangerousness, it will usually be helpful to invite the probation service
to consider whether management of risk could be assisted by a SOPO, and what
restrictionsmight be appropriate. Counsel for the prosecution should be in a position
to submit draft proposals to the court, and to the defence, in good time before the
hearing. If there is insufficient time for defence counsel and the defendant to
consider the order the matter should be put back for proper consideration to be
given. This group of cases shows the Court of Appeal getting to grips with poorly
drafted or ill-considered requirements in SOPOs, in much the same way that in
earlier cases the Court has deprecated inappropriate, over-inclusive, vague, or
poorly drafted requirements in anti-social behaviour orders.37 In fact, it turned out
in Buchanan38 that there was no justification for including prohibitions on the
33Hemsley [2010] EWCA Crim 225.
34Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.215(2).
35R. v R [2010] EWCA Crim 907.
36Buchanan [2010] EWCA Crim 1316.
37P (Shane Tony) [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 343; Boness [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 690.
38Buchanan [2010] EWCA Crim 1316.
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defendant’s access to the internet. The sentencing court had lost track of the fact
that charges of downloading child pornography had not been proceeded with in
that case, and the offences proved against the defendant were of a different
character, not justifying an internet ban at all.
Monitoring and enforcement
In the important case ofMortimer39 the defendant was convicted after trial of three
counts of sexual assault on a child under 13, and one count of causing or inciting
a child to engage in sexual activity. The defendant had a history of sex offences
against children. The judge described him as an “exceptionally dangerous
paedophile” who presented a significant risk to young girls. A sentence of
imprisonment for public protection was passed, with a minimum term of three
years, together with a SOPO, imposed until further order, containing some 16
prohibitions in all. This was another case where the judge was handed a
ready-prepared draft order, with the proposed prohibitions set out. The judge made
the order in those terms. On appeal to the Court of Appeal complaint was made
about prohibitions 11 to 16, which all concerned restrictions on the defendant’s
possession of a computer or mobile phone with internet facility, and his access to
the internet. They were as follows:
(11) possessing a computer;
(12) using the internet or its successor for purposes other than work, study
or seeking employment;
(13) operating a private internet account;
(14) subscribing to, accessing or attempting to access the internet;
(15) downloading and /or viewing on any computer any image of young
persons under 16 unless with permission from a parent or guardian;
(16) possessing a mobile phone or other technology capable of capturing
an image which has been obtained via the internet.
The Court of Appeal struck out or reformulated these provisions, on the basis (i)
that they were not necessary for the protection of the public; or (ii) they were
oppressive and disproportionate, or (iii) that they were almost impossible to police
or enforce. The first two of these grounds are familiar from the authorities referred
to above. The third ground addresses the important practical point of enforcement.
Of course, court orders are there to be obeyed, and breach of a SOPO is a criminal
offence. On the other hand, it is naive for a court to expect “an exceptionally
dangerous paedophile” to confine his use of the internet to do his on-line grocery
shopping and to refrain from accessing child pornography sites. Judges are required
to instruct members of a jury that, although the internet is part of their daily lives,
they must not use it to research the case, nor use any social networking site to
exchange views about the case. A juror can be expected to use the internet when
they leave court, but to refrain from researching the case. Most jurors can be
expected to perform their duties conscientiously and in conformity with judicial
39Mortimer [2010] EWCA Crim 1303.
382 Criminal Law Review
[2011] Crim. L.R., Issue 5 © 2011 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd
instruction, even though there will be the occasional act of defiance.40 It might be
thought, however, that to permit a sex offender access to the internet for some
purposes but not for others involves an unrealistic assumption about such a person’s
capacity for self-control.41
To address the problem of enforcement, the Court of Appeal in Mortimer
redrafted the requirements so as to prohibit the defendant from having ownership
or possession of any computer or mobile phone with access to the internet without
first notifying, within three days, the relevant monitoring police or probation officer
of such acquisition; and to prohibit the defendant from using any computer, iPhone
or mobile phone capable of accessing the internet, where such device does not
have the capacity to retain and display the history of internet use, and frommaking
any attempt to delete such history, and from refusing to show such a history to a
police officer if so requested.42 This decision is important because it recognises
that levels of compliance with internet bans, whether these are expressed generally
or involve restrictions tailored to the facts of the case and the risk posed by the
offender, may well be low.
In the past there have been calls from the police to be given “unlimited powers
to examine the computers” of sex offenders within their homes, to prevent
re-offending.43 In Thompson,44 however, the Court struck down a requirement
which had purported to allow the police unannounced access to the defendant’s
home for the purpose of checking his computer equipment, storage medium and
internet use. The trial judge had already narrowed the scope of the order, by
reducing the time during which the police could demand such access to 12 hours
a day, from 08.00 to 20.00. The Court of Appeal concluded that the condition,
which effectively granted the police a continuing search warrant, was unjustified.
They said that it amounted to conferring on the police an extremely wide power
to enter the defendant’s home to check his computer—a draconian power since it
may be executed repeatedly and without the need to demonstrate any further
justification, over a period of five years. The Court refused, however, to rule out
the possibility that such an order could be justified in appropriate circumstances.45
A similar line was taken in Christopher Smith,46 where the SOPO had prevented
the defendant from owning, having access to, or using, any computer having access
to the internet save in the course of his business or at a place of employment or
educational establishment, and further preventing the defendant from “denying
police officers access to his home address in order to check the above conditions
are being complied with”. The Court of Appeal said that such a requirement was
problematic in a number of ways. First, according to s.117(1)(a), a SOPO was
meant to “prohibit” the defendant from doing certain things, but this prohibition
in reality was a mandatory requirement that he grant access to police officers who
would otherwise need permission to enter his home. It was a “device” to circumvent
40Thompson [2010] EWCACrim 1623; [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. 27, consideringMirza [2004] 1 A.C. 1118 HL; [2004]
2 Cr. App. R. 8. See alsoKarakaya [2005] EWCACrim 346; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 5; [2005] Crim. L.R. 574;Marshall
[2007] EWCA Crim 35; [2007] Crim. L.R. 562, and Thakrar [2008] EWCA Crim 2359; [2009] Crim. L.R. 357.
41See D. Wilson and T. Jones, “‘In my own world’: A case study of a paedophile’s thinking and doing and his use
of the Internet” (2008) 47(2) Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 107.
42Mortimer [2010] EWCA Crim 1303 at [15]. See also TO [2010] EWCA Crim 2511.
43 Police “need full access to sex offenders’ PCs”, The Scotsman, March 26, 2007.
44 Thompson [2009] EWCA Crim 3258.
45 See also Hemsley [2010] EWCA Crim 225.
46 Smith (Christopher Robert) [2009] EWCA Crim 785; [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 110.
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the statutory wording. There were also strong arguments to say that if the legislature
had intended to grant power to law enforcement agencies to enter a defendant’s
home to monitor compliance with the order, it would have said so expressly in the
Act. Further, this particular term of the SOPO was too wide, in that it did not limit
when the police could demand entry, at what times, or how often. It did not require
the police to have reasonable suspicion of an offence, but it appeared that the
defendant must permit entry, however unreasonable, or risk prosecution for breach.
In the end, the Court in Christopher Smith chose to strike down the requirement
to grant access to the police on the basis that the defendant’s limited level of
offending on the facts could not justify such a requirement, but Keith J. specifically
stepped back from holding that such a requirement could never be justified. It is
also interesting to note that the Court in Thompson felt that “any provision for
monitoring the applicant’s use of computers and the Internet” was unjustifiable in
this case, but was content with a different stipulation in the order that, as well as
requiring prior notification to the police, the defendant must allow “the programme
‘Net Nanny’ or similar programme to be installed”. Such programmes are generally
referred to as “filtering” programmes and operate so as to monitor a person’s use
of the internet, similar in kind to a person’s browsing history referred to in
Mortimer, but with substantially greater functionality.
Filtering programmes are complex, but can be seen as essentially comprising
two key elements. First, they contain data lists, usually supplied and updated by
the software supplier, but also customisable by the user (such as a parent), detailing
the content, sites and services that are considered acceptable (“white lists”) and/or,
those that are unacceptable (“black lists”). The data lists may relate to the content
of a communication, such as keywords or image-related content, or may relate to
the location of content available over the internet, such as IP address or Uniform
Resource Locator (“URL”). Secondly, they can monitor both the communication
requests made by the user (egress traffic), as well as the content being received
from the internet (ingress traffic). The record of such usage is then available for
review, including remotely, either in real time47 or at a later date. As such,
acceptance by the Court in Thompson of the requirement to install and operate
such a programme constitutes the real and effective monitoring of the defendant’s
internet activities. In such an environment, the need for on-going police access to
the defendant’s premises becomes amuch less necessary element of the enforcement
regime, and perhaps only really important in examining materials received through
the post.
In addition to the installation of filtering or monitoring programmes on the
defendant’s computer equipment or device, an alternative record of online activities
will often be retained by the person providing the defendant with access to the
internet, such as an employer48 or an internet service provider (“ISP”). Such
historical “logs” of internet use may have to be retained on a statutory basis, such
as by ISPs subject to the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 200949 or,
47 e.g. Net Nanny TM 6.5 offers real time text alerts to a parent’s mobile phone.
48 e.g. in December 2005, Gary McKinnon’s bail conditions were altered to permit internet access on condition
that he notifies the authorities of his IP address and obtains a letter from his employer.
49SI 2009/859. A “public communications provider”, once notified by the Secretary of State (r.10(1)), must retain
communications data, including that concerning internet access, internet email or internet telephony (Sch., Pt 3), for
a period of 12 months (r.5).
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more commonly, by the ISP for organisational or commercial purposes, such as
network management, customer profiling and marketing.50 To obtain access to
such retained data, the police would need to comply with the procedures for
accessing “communications data” under Pt I, Chapter II of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“the RIPA”).51 There are problems, however, in
that such procedures can be costly in terms of the payment which has to be made
to ISPs for the data,52 and they are not designed for the type of on-going monitoring
and spot-checks likely to be required for SOPO supervision and enforcement.
The existence of data held by a third party returns us to consideration of the
Digital Economy Act 2010 and the issuing of suspension orders. As well as the
controversy over the idea of suspending an individual’s internet access service,
considerable disquiet had been raised by the ISP industry about their role in such
an enforcement regime.53 The provisions represent interference in the private law
relations between an ISP and their subscriber, purportedly justified on grounds of
public interest in protecting the rights of copyright owners against online
infringement.54 If such an argument is eventually accepted, then it would seem
equally arguable that ISPs should be required to support the enforcement of SOPOs
imposed on convicted criminals. An ISP could be required to filter the traffic of
a specific account of a person subject to a SOPO, as well as maintain and make
available appropriate activity logs. UK-based ISPs already filter the web requests
of all their customers against a list of addresses where “potentially illegal child
sexual abuse” content is located.55 While enforcement of SOPOs through ISP
monitoring may be permissible under European Union law,56 serious questions
remain about whether such an approach would be viewed as proportionate under
the ECHR, as well as desirable.
A final enforcement concern may be that a defendant could install some form
of technical mechanism, such as software, to prevent a supervising officer from
examining material stored on a computer or related device. In October 2010, for
example, Oliver Drage was given a 16 week custodial sentence for refusing to
disclose his password during an investigation into child sexual abuse.57 In terms
50 Subject to compliance with the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (SI
2003/2426) rr.7 and 8.
51The probation service is not currently an authorised authority under this part: see the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers (Communications Data) Order 2003 (SI 2003/3172).
52 See, for example, BBC News, “Child abuse unit paying for data” (January 21, 2009), which reported that the
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre had paid more than £170k to ISPs since 2006.
53 In July 2010, BT and TalkTalk commenced an action for judicial review of these provisions, including on grounds
of it being a disproportionate measure: R (on the application of British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom
Group plc) v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, Administrative Court Ref. No.CO/7354/2010. On
November 11, 2010, the High Court granted permission to proceed with the action on all of the grounds raised by
the claimants.
54Lord Mandelson, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Hansard, December 2, 2009; Col 745:
“the need for government and for the law to protect the rights of content holders, so we are creating two new obligations
on internet service providers”.
55The list created, maintained and made available by the Internet Watch Foundation. See further I. Walden, “Porn,
Pipes and the State: Censoring Internet Content”, The Barrister, No.44, April–May 2010, pp.16–17.
56 See Directive 00/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1 at recital 47: “Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring
obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern monitoring
obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with
national legislation.” In March 2010, the Commission issued a proposal for a directive “on combating the sexual
abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography”, which includes a provision, at art.21, requiringMember
States to take measures to block access to websites containing child pornography, (COM(2010)94 final).
57 e.g. BBC News, “Man jailed over computer password refusal”, October 5, 2010.
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of post-conviction preventive orders, further prohibitions may be imposed to
address such concerns. In April 2007, for example, AndrewHadwinwas imprisoned
for distributing pornographic images and was reported as having being banned
“from having a password to a private home computer”.58 The forensic challenge
of dealing with such “protected” data is a recognised problem for cybercrime
investigations and has been specifically addressed in Part III of the RIPA.59
Conclusion
As recent decisions clearly indicate, where a court wishes to control the future
online activities of convicted sex offenders, a simple outright prohibition of a
person’s access to the internet will be struck down on appeal, both for offending
proportionality and because it is unrealistic. Meeting the statutory criterion of
“necessity” and the general principle of proportionality, including considerations
of collateral interference, are high thresholds. These are likely to rise further as
the internet becomes ever more integrated into our daily lives. As such, the
experience of our courts with SOPOs does not bode well for the enforceability of
the proposed suspension orders under the Digital Economy Act.
In future, sexual offence prevention orders will surely need to be couched less
in terms of specific devices, such as computers andmobile phones (let alone brands,
such as the iPhone referred to in Mortimer), and should focus instead on the
functionality of accessing the internet and internet-based services. Usage-based
restrictions, whether negative (e.g. not to communicate on-line with any person
under 16 years of age) or qualified (e.g. permitting access to the internet for work
and study purposes), must become more closely integrated with techniques of
enforcement. In principle, technology has the capacity to monitor, record, and
disclose every aspect of our on-line activities.60 Technological monitoring may
well be less intrusive than permitting periodic access by the police to check on-line
usage.More work would need to be done, however, on specifying the access regime
by which the police or probation service can review the records generated.
There is a difficult balance to be struck between the effective monitoring of a
preventive order such as a SOPO, and unacceptable intrusion into the defendant’s
life and the lives of his family and others. As the large number of recent sentencing
appeals in relation to SOPOs makes clear, piecemeal development in this area is
not satisfactory, and different divisions of the Court of Appeal sometimes say
different things. It is submitted that guidelines should be drawn up by the new
Sentencing Council and issued to assist counsel and the courts in setting the content
of requirements in SOPOs. The Sentencing Guidelines Council, in its work on
breach of ASBOs, also addressed the “key principles and considerations applicable
to themaking of an ASBO”.61A similar task is required here. The guidelines should
further set out best practice for dealing with the monitoring and enforcement issues
considered in this article. Because a SOPO is generally now set to the same length
as the relevant notification period under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a defendant
58 “Child porn ‘too easy to find’”, The Oxford Mail, April 18, 2007.
59 See further I. Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (Oxford: OUP, 2007) at paras 4.275 et seq.
60 See further M. McGuire, “Online surveillance and personal liberty” in Yvonne Jewkes and Majid Yar (eds),
Handbook of Internet Crime (Willan, 2009), Ch.23.
61 SGC, Breach of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order, December 2008, Annex A.
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in breach of one of these provisions is likely to be in breach of both. The Court of
Appeal has suggested recently that guidelines on sentencing for breach of SOA
notification requirements would be helpful.62 Logically, that could also be part of
the same project.
62Grosvenor [2010] EWCA Crim 560; [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 100.
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